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Abstract. A durable good is a long-lasting good that can be consumed repeatedly over
time, and a duropolist is a monopolist in the market of a durable good. In 1972, Ronald
Coase conjectured that a duropolist who lacks commitment power cannot sell the good above
the competitive price if the time between periods approaches zero. Coase’s counterintuitive
conjecture was later proven by Gul et al. (1986) under an infinite time horizon model with non-
atomic consumers. Remarkably, the situation changes dramatically for atomic consumers and
an infinite time horizon. Bagnoli et al. (1989) showed the existence of a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium where the duropolist extracts all the consumer surplus. Observe that, in these cases,
duropoly profits are either arbitrarily smaller or arbitrarily larger than the corresponding static
monopoly profits – the profit a monopolist for an equivalent consumable good could generate.
In this paper we show that the result of Bagnoli et al. (1989) is in fact driven by the infinite time
horizon. Indeed, we prove that for finite time horizons and atomic agents, in any equilibrium
satisfying the standard skimming property, duropoly profits are at most an additive factor more
than static monopoly profits. Specifically, this additive factor is equal to the static monopoly
price, which implies that duropoly profits never exceed twice the static monopoly profits.
Finally we show that, for atomic consumers, equilibria may exist that do not satisfy the
skimming property. We prove that amongst all equilibria that maximize duropoly profits, at
least one of them satisfies the skimming property in the two-period setting. Keywords: durable
goods monopoly, discrete buyers, profit bounds, inter-temporal price discrimination, skimming
property.
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1 Introduction
A durable good is a long-lasting good that can be consumed repeatedly over time. Theoretically
less is known about durable goods than their more well-studied counterparts, consumable and
perishable goods. However, on the practical side, durable goods abound and are very familiar
to us. For example, many of the most important consumer items are (at least to some extent)
durable, such as land, housing, cars, etc. A duropolist is a monopolist in the market of a
durable good – topically, duropolists include several well-known purveyors of digital goods.
Indeed, Amazon has recently been awarded a US patent (8,364,595) for establishing market
places for second-hand digital-content items, and Apple has recently applied for a similar patent
(20130060616).
Pricing a durable good is not as simple as it may appear. Specifically, whilst a durable
good is more valuable to the consumer than an equivalent perishable good, it is questionable
whether a duropolist has additional monopoly power beyond that of an equivalent monopolist
for a perishable good. Indeed, quite the opposite may be true. In 1972, Nobel recipient Ronald
Coase made the startling conjecture that, in fact, a duropolist has no monopoly power at all!
Specifically, a duropolist who lacks commitment power cannot sell the good above the compet-
itive price if the time between periods approaches zero (Coase, 1972). The intuition behind
the Coase conjecture is that if the monopolist charges a high price then consumers anticipate a
future price reduction (as they expect the duropolist to later target lower value consumers) and
therefore they prefer to wait. The duropolist, anticipating this consumer behaviour, will then
drop prices down to the competitive level. In essence, the argument is that a duropolist is not a
monopolist at all: the firm does face stiff competition – not from other firms but, rather, from
future incarnations of itself! This is known as the commitment problem: the duropolist cannot
credibly commit to charging a high price.
The Coase conjecture was first proven by Gul et al. (1986) under an infinite time horizon
model with non-atomic consumers. They showed that if buyers strategies are stationary (that
is, the distribution of consumers after the duropolist announces a price p, lower than all pre-
vious prices, is independent of the prior price history) then, as period length goes to zero, the
duropolist’s first price offer converges to the lowest consumer valuation or the marginal cost,
whichever is higher. Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) later showed that if the stationary condition
is relaxed, the duropolists profits at subgame perfect equilibria can range from Coasian profits
to the static monopoly profit.1 Stokey (1979) studied pricing mechanisms for duropolists that
possess commitment power in a continuous time model. She showed that duropolists can then
1However, profits larger than the Coasian value occur only in the case where there is no gap between the lowest
consumer value and the marginal cost of production (e.g. for c = 0, the lowest consumer value is 0).
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attain the static monopoly profit by committing to a fixed price; all sales are then made at the
beginning of the game. McAfee and Wiseman (2008) examined the Coase conjecture in a model
where there is small cost for production capacity which can be augmented at each period. In
this setting, the authors showed that in the the monopoly profits are equal to those that can
be obtained if she could commit ex ante to a fixed capacity. Recently, Ortner (2016) studied a
model where the duropolist incurs in a stochastic cost.
Underlying the results of Gul et al. (1986) is the assumption of an infinite time horizon.
There are nevertheless situations where trade must take place before a hard deadline. For
example, consider a TV network selling advertising space a week in advance of a show. The-
oretical and empirical evidence of the strong effects of deadlines have been observed in many
bargaining contexts such as in contract negotiations and civil case settlements – see, for example,
Cramton and Tracy (1992), Williams (1983) and Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2011).
If there is a finite horizon and non-atomic consumers, a feasible action for the duropolist is to
decline to sell goods until the final period and then announce the static monopoly price, obtaining
the static monopoly profits discounted to the beginning of the game. Although this strategy is
not an equilibrium, Guth and Ritzberger (1998) showed that when consumer valuations follow
a uniform distribution, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium, as period lengths approach
zero, in which the duropolist profits converge to the static monopoly profits discounted to the
beginning of the game.
All these results assumed non-atomic consumers. Less is known about the duropolist problem
with atomic consumers. The major difficulty in analyzing equilibria in this setting is that a
deviation from a single consumer can modify the equilibrium price path. This characteristic, as
we will later show, permits the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria where the skimming
property does not hold, i.e. an equilibrium where a buyer with a higher valuation might buy
later (and at a lower price) than a buyer with lower valuation. Bagnoli et al. (1989) studied
the duropoly problem with atomic consumers. When the time horizon is infinite, they proved
another surprising result: the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which the
duropolist extracts all the consumer surplus. To obtain this, they considered the following pair
of strategies. The duropolist strategy, dubbed Pacman, is to announce at each time period, a
price equal to the valuation of the consumer with the highest value who has yet to buy. The
strategy of each consumer, dubbed get-it-while-you-can, is to buy the first time it induces a
non-negative utility. If there is an infinite horizon, and the discount factor is large enough, then
these strategies are sequential best responses to each other. This equilibrium refutes the Coase
conjecture when there is a finite set of atomic buyers and an infinite time horizon. Indeed, it
suggests that a duropolist may have perfect price discriminatory power! Moreover, it shows
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there exist subgame perfect Nash equilibria where duropoly profits exceeds the static monopoly
profits by an unbounded factor.2 Later, von der Fehr and Kuhn (1995) showed that under
certain conditions Pacman is the only equilibrium.
Another setting, in which the extremely large profits of the Pacman equilibrium of Bagnoli et al.
(1989) cannot exist, was proposed by Cason and Sharma (2001). Instead of assuming a duropolist
with perfect information, the authors constructed a two-buyer and two-valuation model with
infinite time periods in which the duropolist does not know exactly whether a consumer is of
high type or of low type. They showed that in these games there exists a unique equilibrium
that is Coasian.
Recently, Montez (2013) studied the duropoly problem under infinite horizon with atomic
consumers that have two-types (high value consumers and low value consumers) and exactly two
consumers are of the high-value type. He showed that there are sometimes inefficient equilibria
where the time at which the market clears does not converge to zero as the length of the trading
periods approaches zero.
Bagnoli et al. (1989) also examined very small examples with a finite time horizon case. They
showed that in these games of two or three consumers, it is possible to obtain subgame perfect
equilibria where the duropolist extracts more revenue than the price commitment strategy of
Stokey (1979). These examples again refute the Coase conjecture but they also suggest that,
even for finite time horizons, the duropolist may havemore monopoly power than the equivalent
static monopolist. This is very interesting because, whilst duropolists are not believed to be
powerless in practice, the standard assumption is that duropolists are weaker than monopolists
for consumable goods. Indeed this argument has been accepted by the Federal Courts in the
United States; a history of duropolies and the law can be found in Orbach (2004).
1.1 Contributions
Several questions arise from the work of Bagnoli et al. (1989). Does this phenomenon (of
duropoly profits exceeding static monopoly profits) arise for more natural games where the
number of consumers and the number of time periods is much larger than three? If so, how can
we characterize the monopolist profit maximizing strategy? Finally, can we quantify exactly how
much more profit a duropolist can obtain at equilibria in comparison to a static monopolist?
Our main contributions is to answer those three questions. To achieve this, we first char-
acterize, in Section 3, a class of subgame perfect equilibria that satisfy the standard skimming
property: high-value consumers buy before lower-valued consumers.3 Our main result, proven
2For example, consider a game with N consumers where buyer i has a valuation of 1/i. Then, as N gets large,
duropoly profits under the Pacman strategy approach logN whilst static monopoly profits are clearly equal to 1.
3Bagnoli et al. (1989) state that such a characterization would be extremely interesting.
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in Section 5, is then that, at equilibria, duropoly profits are approximately equal to the static
monopoly profits. Specifically we show that duropoly profits are at most the static monopoly
profits plus the static monopoly price regardless of the number of consumers, their values, and
the number of time periods. It follows from this result that duropoly profits are at most twice
the static monopoly profits. We also prove that this factor two bound is tight: we construct a
(infinite) family of examples where duropoly profits approach double the static monopoly profit
as the number of consumers goes to infinity. This construction also gives tightness for the addi-
tive bound as the difference between the duropoly profits and the static monopoly profits tends
to the static monopoly price.
We believe that our main result sheds light into this classical problem in at least four ways.
To begin, this is the first theoretical result that concurs with the practical experience that
duropolists and static monopolists have comparable profitability. (Recall that previous theoret-
ical works have suggested that the duropolist either has no monopoly power or has perfect price
discriminatory power).
Second, the result that a duropolist can do up to an additive amount better using a threat-
based strategy rather than a price-commitment strategy is actually best viewed from the opposite
direction. Specifically, a duropolist can obtain almost the optimum profit (losing at most an
additive amount equal to the static monopoly price) by mimicking a static monopolist via a
price commitment strategy. From a practical perspective this is important because a price-
commitment strategy can generally be implemented by the duropolist very easily, even with
limited consumer information. Furthermore, price-commitment strategies can be popular with
consumers as they are typically introduced within a money back guarantee or envy-free pricing
framework. In contrast, a threat based optimization strategy is harder to implement and can
antagonize consumers.
Thirdly, the standard view in the literature is that the surprising and well-known result of
Bagnoli et al. (1989), namely that the duropolist can extract all consumer surplus, is due to
the assumption of atomic consumers. Our results show that this is not true in general – their
result is driven by the infinite time horizon. For finite time horizons, the power of a duropolist
is limited. This is true even when the Pacman strategy is an equilibrium; indeed, we show that
the Pacman strategy can be an equilibrium in finite time horizon games only under very specific
conditions4 – see Section 4.
Finally, the main result highlights a distinction in how the time horizon affects bargaining
power. With non-atomic consumers, a finite time horizon increases the bargaining power of
the duropolist. In Guth and Ritzberger (1998), a finite time-horizon increases duropolist profits
4The Pacman strategy will not produce an equilibrium in games with finite horizons unless consumer valuations
decrease exponentially.
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from the Coasian result to the static monopoly profits. With atomic consumers, the finiteness
of the time horizon, reduces duropolist profits from all consumer surplus to approximately the
static monopoly profits (and at most twice that).
To conclude the paper, we examine (in Section 6) subgame perfect equilibria in the absence
of the skimming-property. We provide the first example of a subgame perfect equilibrium in
which the skimming-property does not hold. Furthermore, we prove that for two-period games,
amongst all equilibria that maximize duropoly profits at least one satisfies the skimming prop-
erty.
2 The Model
We now present the durable good monopoly model of Bagnoli et al. (1989) that we will analyze
in the subsequent sections. Consider a durable good market with one seller (a duropolist),
N consumers and a finite horizon of T time periods. The N consumers have valuations v1 ≥
v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vN
5 and the firm can produce units of the good at a unitary cost of c dollars.
Here we assume, without loss of generality, that c = 0. Consequently, profit and revenue are
interchangeable in this setting.
We can view this as a sequential game over T periods. At time t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T , the firm
will select a price µt to charge for the good.
6 The duropolist seeks a pricing strategy that
maximises her revenue, namely
∑T
t=1(xt · µt), where xt denotes the number of consumers who
buy in period t.
Each consumer i desires at most one item and seeks to maximize her utility, which is vi−µt
if she buys the good in period t.7 The consumers decide simultaneously if they will buy an item
for µt. The game then proceeds to period t+ 1. If a consumer doesn’t buy an item before the
end of period T her utility is zero.
For such a sequential game, the solutions we examine are pure subgame perfect Nash equi-
libria that satisfy the standard skimming property defined below.
Definition 2.1 (Skimming property). An equilibrium satisfies the skimming property if when-
ever a buyer with value v is willing to buy at price µt, given the previous history of prices
µ1, µ2, . . . , µt−1, then a buyer with value w > v is also willing to buy at this price given the same
history.
5We also use notation v(yj) instead of vyj in certain cases to avoid nested subscripts
6Note neither the model of Bagnoli et al. (1989), that we analyze in this paper, nor any of the other durable
good monopoly models mentioned in the literature review section allow for discriminatory pricing mechanisms in
which two or more consumers can be charged different prices in the same time period.
7Discount factors can easily be introduced into the model.
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For subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) that satisfy the skimming property, consumers’
strategies can be characterized using a cutoff function. Given a history of prices ht = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µt−1)
and the current offered price µt, consumers with valuations above cutoff κ(ht, µt, t) buy and
consumers with valuations below the cutoff do not buy (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a
discussion). When consumers are non-atomic it can be shown that all subgame perfect equilibria
satisfy the skimming property (Fudenberg et al., 1985). In the case of atomic consumers and an
infinite time horizon, the monopolist can extract all consumer surplus using the pacman strat-
egy, in which case the skimming property is clearly satisfied. Intuitively, the skimming property
says that higher value consumers pay a higher (or at least equal) price compared to consumers
with a lower valuation.
Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) define two special types of SPNE that are Markovian in the
sense that they depend only on the most recent information available. A SPNE is a weak-
Markov equilibrium if consumers’ accept/reject decisions depend only on the current price and
period. A SPNE is a strong-Markov equilibrium if, in addition to the weak Markov property,
the duropolist conditions her strategy only on the payoff-relevant part of the history. In the
infinite horizon case, this is the set of remaining consumers. In the finite horizon case, it may
depend on the number of periods left as well. When consumers are non-atomic, such equilibria
only exist when the Weak-Markov property is satisfied and = κ(µt, t) := κ(ht, µt, t) (since
consumers’ accept/reject decisions do not depend on the price history) is strictly increasing in
µt (Fudenberg et al., 1985). In the atomic case, we can obtain strong-Markov equilibria even if
κ is constant over an interval.
When constructing an SPNE in the atomic finite-horizon model, we will therefore restrict the
strategy space of the duropolist and consumers so that they satisfy the strong-Markov conditions:
the prices the duropolist chooses are a function that depends only on the remaining consumers
and the number of time periods left, that is, µ : P([N ])×T → R+ and the consumers strategies
are such that i buys in period t iff vi ≥ κ(µt, t) for some function κ. However, our main result
from Section 5 only requires the equilibrium satisfies the skimming property.
Observe that in the model of Bagnoli et al. (1989) which we studied in this paper, the values
of each consumer are known to all participants in the market. In Appendix 2 we extend the
equilibrium results to a restricted incomplete information setting, where the duropolist knows
the distribution of values, but not which value corresponds to which consumer.
2.1 An Example
We now present an small example to illustrate the model and the concepts involved. Consider
a two-period game with the following consumers’ valuations.
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Table 1: Example of a game with 4 consumers.
Consumer Consumer value
1 100
2 85
3 80
4 50
Table 2: Threat prices
Consumer Consumer value Threat price
1 100 80
2 85 80
3 80 50
4 50 50
Denote by ΠD and ΠM the revenue obtainable by the duropolist and the corresponding static
monopolist, respectively. Then the static monopoly profit ΠM is equal to 240, obtained by selling
to the top three consumers for a price of 80. However, the duropolist can, in fact, extract a
revenue of 260. Furthermore, the corresponding equilibrium satisfies the skimming property: no
consumer will buy earlier than another consumer with a higher valuation. To understand SPNEs
in this game, let’s begin with a subgame comprising of only the final (second) time period. In
such a subgame, it is a dominant strategy for all consumers who have not yet bought to pay
any price less than or equal to their value. Consequently, in the final period, it is a dominant
strategy for the duropolist to charge the static monopoly price as calculated with respect to the
set of consumers who have not yet bought. Note that these strategies satisfy the strong-Markov
property as everyone remaining with value above the price will buy, everyone else will not buy,
and the price depends only on the set of consumers remaining.
Now consider the first time period. If the skimming property is satisfied, then there will be
a cut-off point j1 at which consumers j ≤ j1 buy and consumers j > j1 wait until period 2. In
order for this to be an equilibrium, the consumer j1 must prefer buying in period 1 to period 2.
Therefore, the duropolist can charge no more than the static monopoly price as calculated if all
consumers j ≥ j1 wait until period 2. We call this price the threat price for consumer j1. The
threat prices are listed in Table 2.1.
The consumers’ strategies then correspond to “buy in period 1 if and only if µ1 is at most
their threat price”, whilst the duropolist’s strategy is to charge the threat price which maxi-
mizes the total revenue. The period 2 strategies are the dominant strategies described above:
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remaining consumers pay up to their value, while the duropolist charges the static monopoly
price calculated for the set of consumers that are left.
Charging µ1 = 80 means that the top two consumers would buy in period 1, while the last
two consumers would wait until period 2 and buy at µ2 = 50 (the static monopoly price for the
remaining two consumers is 50). The total profit would therefore be 260. It is easy to see that
charging 50 < µ1 < 80 gives a smaller profit. Moreover, if µ1 > 80 then no consumers will buy
in the first period. This would lead to a profit of 240 as the static monopoly price would then
be charged in the final period. Finally charging µ1 = 50 would result in all consumers buying
in period 1, as the duropolist is guaranteed to charge at least 50 in period 2. The total profit
would then be 200. Thus, for a profit maximizing duropolist we have ΠD = 260. So duropoly
profits are greater than static monopoly profits. For additional comparisons, Coasian profits are
ΠC = 200 since the competitive price is 50, and Price Discriminatory profits are ΠPD = 315,
that is, the consumer surplus.
Observe that these strategies satisfy the skimming property, as threat prices are monoton-
ically increasing with consumer value, and satisfy the weak-Markov property, as κ(µt, t) is the
smallest consumer value such that his threat price is larger than µt. Note that κ(µ1, 1) is constant
for all µ1 ∈ (50, 80]. Since the duropolist’s strategy depends only on the values of remaining
players in each period (trivially in period 1) it also satisfies the strong-Markov property. Fur-
thermore, it is easy to see that this is an equilibrium. Consumers 3 and 4 would be worse off
buying in the first period, while both consumers 1 and 2 would still pay 80 if either deviated by
waiting until the last period. Similarly, the duropolist would find no buyers if he charged more
than 80 in period 1, turning the game into a one-period static game and giving him revenue
ΠM , while charging anything between 80 and 50 would yield the same sales schedule but with
lower profit. Charging 50 or lower would result in all consumers buying in period 1 for profit at
most 200.
We remark that the equilibrium property for the consumers arises from a simple property of
static monopoly prices. Take the set of consumers {j ≥ j1} and compute the static monopoly
price for these consumers. This is j1’s threat price. Now if we take j1 and replace him by a
higher valued consumer then the static monopoly price can only rise. Hence, as long as µ1 is
j1’s threat price, any consumer of higher value that refuses to buy in period 1 would be charged
at least µ1 in period 2, ensuring it is a best response to buy in period 1.
In Section 3, we show how these arguments can be extended to give subgame perfect equilibria
conditions for games with more than two time periods and explain how, given these constraints,
a duropolist can efficiently maximize profits.
9
3 Sub-Game Perfect Equilibria Conditions
We now characterize the subgame perfect equilibria that satisfy the strong-Markov conditions
and maximize duropolist profits. To do this we reason backwards from the final time period T .
It is easy to determine the behaviour of rational consumers and a profit maximizing duropolist
at time T . Given this information, we can determine the behaviour of rational consumers at
time T − 1, etc.
To formalize this, let Gi denote the market consisting of consumers {i, i+1, . . . , N}, and let
Π(i, t) denote the maximum profit obtainable in the market Gi if we begin in time period t. Thus
ΠD = Π(1, 1). Now set Π(i, T + 1) = 0 for all consumers i. Let p(i, t) be the profit maximizing
price at period t in the market Gi beginning at time t. First, consider the last period, T . Any
consumer i (who has not yet bought the good) will buy in period T if and only if this final price
is at most vi. Therefore, in the market Gi, starting at time T , a profit maximizing duropolist will
simply set p(i, T ) to be the static monopoly price pi for the market Gi: p(i, T ) = pi ≡ vj∗(i,T ),
where
j∗(i, T ) = argmax
j≥i
(j − i+ 1) · vj .
Thus, j∗(i, T ) denotes the consumer with the lowest valuation who buys in the market Gi be-
ginning at period T . The profit is then
Π(i, T ) = (j∗(i, T )− i+ 1) · vj∗(i,T )
In general we will denote by j∗(i, t), the consumer with the lowest valuation who buys (under
our proposed strategy) at period t in the market Gi beginning at period t. Now, suppose we are
at time period T−1 in the market Gi. If the duropolist at period T−1 wishes to sell to consumers
{i, i+ 1, . . . , k}, then the announced price has to be at most k’s threat price, p(k, T ) ≡ vj∗(k,T ).
To see this, suppose that the price announced at T − 1 is higher and the duropolist still expects
to sell the item to consumers {i, i + 1, . . . , k}. Then, if consumer k refuses to buy while all
consumers above her buy, the duropolist would, in the final time period T be in the market Gk,
and announce a price p(k, T ), meaning that consumer k would have benefited from deviating.
So, the optimal strategy for the duropolist would be to sell to k − i + 1 consumers at period
T − 1 at price vj∗(k,T ), choosing the value of k such that the profits from periods T − 1 and T
are maximized:
j∗(i, T − 1) = argmax
k≥i
{(k − i+ 1) · p(k, T ) + Π(k + 1, T )}
Π(i, T − 1) = (j∗(i, T − 1)− i+ 1) · p(j∗(i, T − 1), T ) + Π(j∗(i, T − 1) + 1, T )
The price announced at period T − 1 can then be written as
p(i, T − 1) = p(j∗(i, T − 1), T )
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Observe then, that in the final period, we will be in the subgame composed of consumers
{j∗(i, T − 1) + 1, . . . , N}.
Iterating this argument backwards in terms of the periods, we have that
Π(i, t) = (j∗(i, t)− i+ 1) · p(j∗(i, t), t + 1) + Π(j∗(i, t) + 1, t+ 1)
j∗(i, t) = argmax
j≥i
((j − i+ 1) · p(j, t+ 1) + Π(j + 1, t+ 1)) (1)
p(i, t) = p(j∗(i, t), t + 1)
We can generalize the concept of the threat price from our two-period example using the
above recursion. Specifically, we say that the threat price τ(i, t) for consumer i at period t < T
under the recursive scheme given in (1) is the price i is offered in the market Gi starting at
period t + 1, namely τ(i, t) := p(i, t + 1). That is, the price offered if i and all consumers of
lower value do not buy in period t.
We can now define the strategy of the duropolist and the consumers in any subgame. Con-
sider a subgame whose remaining consumers are the set S and let there be T − t + 1 periods
remaining (i.e. we are starting in period t). Then by re-indexing the consumer names, the
duropolist can treat the subgame as a full game G′ with T − t + 1 total periods and S as the
set of all consumers. She then calculates, for all i and t, the prices pG′(i, t) from the recursion
relationship (1) and chooses the sales schedule which maximizes her profits for G′. She then
charges µt = pG′(1, 1) in period t. The consumers buy if and only if the price is less than or
equal to their threat price as calculated for G′. By definition, this price only depends on the
payoff-relevant part of the history, as it only looks at the consumers remaining in the subgame.
Since the price is always equal to the threat price of one consumer j∗, we can define κ(µt, t)
to be the value of this critical consumer, vj∗ . We can show that this function is monotonically
increasing in µ if the threat prices are decreasing in consumer value (a higher price means a
higher valued critical consumer). This is proved in Lemma 3.2. Therefore κ is indeed a cutoff
function for the given consumer strategies. We conclude that, if this strategy profile is an SPNE,
it must satisfy the strong-Markov property.
The reader may have noted that our recursion relationship does not allow the duropolist to
refuse to sell any items in a period where there are still consumers left who have not yet bought.
It can be shown that there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which a sale occurs in each period
until either all consumers have bought the item or the final time period is over. Moreover, this
equilibrium achieves at least as much profit for the duropolist as any which allows the duropolist
to not sell in some periods. A proof of this is included in Appendix 1 as Lemma A5.
The following series of lemmas establish basic monotonicity results for static monopoly prices,
threat prices, and the prices p(i, t) which form the duropolist’s equilibrium strategy. The proofs
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of these lemmas are give in Appendix 1.
Lemma 3.1. The static monopoly prices on the markets Gi are non-increasing in i: pi ≥ pi+1
for i = 1, . . . , N − 1.
The following lemma shows that the consumers’ strategies defined above satisfy the skimming
property.
Lemma 3.2. In any game G with T periods, the threat prices are non-increasing in i: for all
i ≤ k and all t < T , τ(i, t) ≥ τ(k, t).
The next two lemmas are required to show that a deviation from a consumer by delaying a
purchase or buying early does not yield higher utility.
Lemma 3.3. Consider two duropoly games, G, with T periods and a set S of consumers, and
G′, with T periods and a set S′ of consumers such that only the top valued consumer in S
and S′ differ, and the top valued consumer in S′ has the higher value. If we use pG(1, 1) and
pG′(1, 1) to denote the first period prices as calculated by the recursion relationship above, then
pG′(1, 1) ≥ pG(1, 1).
Lemma 3.4. In any game G with T periods, if the duropolist and consumers follow the strategies
described above, then prices are non-increasing in time.
We are now ready to prove the following result.
Theorem 3.1. The strategies defined above constitute a SPNE.
Proof. Since we can treat any subgame as an instance of a full game with a different set of
consumers, there is no loss of generality in assuming that the deviation occurs in the first period
of the full game. Let j∗(1, 1) be the lowest value consumer sold to in equilibrium and assume
that a consumer x ≤ j∗(1, 1) deviates by not buying in period 1. If x = j∗(1, 1), then x is charged
her threat price in the next period, which by definition is p∗(1, 1), so there is no advantage in a
deviation. If x < j∗(1, 1), then the remaining consumers for period 2 are {x, j∗ + 1, ..., N}. We
know that if the set of consumers was {j∗, j∗ + 1, ..., N}, then the price would be p∗(1, 1). But
by Lemma 3.3, the price with consumers {x, j∗ + 1, ..., N} must be at least as high as p∗(1, 1).
Therefore x cannot gain by delaying her purchase for one period.
One may wonder whether consumer x could benefit from delaying the purchase by more
than one period. But this is not the case. Consider the subgame G′ arrived at after x delays
purchase for t−1 periods in the full game, and after re-indexing so the remaining consumers are
sorted by value from highest to lowest. If x = j∗(1, t) for this subgame, the price at period t+1
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is p(j∗(1, t), t + 1) = p(j∗(j∗(1, t), t + 1), t + 2). This means that the price at t + 2 will be the
same as the price at t + 1 if consumer x doesn’t buy and everyone else follows the equilibrium
path. If, on the other hand, consumer x < j∗(1, t) for subgame G′, the price at period t + 2
could only increase or stay equal to p(j∗(j∗(1, t), t + 1), t + 2) by Lemma 3.3. By repeated use
of this argument we conclude that, at equilibrium, no consumer would benefit from delaying its
purchase.
It remains to show that no consumer can benefit from buying early. If a consumer deviates
from the equilibrium path by buying early, she pays a price p∗(1, t) when she could have bought
in period t′ > t at price p∗(k, t′) for some k > 0. But since prices are non-increasing as a function
of time along the proposed sales path (Lemma 3.4), she cannot do any better.
It follows that we have a strategy profile which is an equilibrium in every subgame.
To compute such an equilibrium, we can compute j∗(i, t) for each (i, t) going backwards
from period T , and choose the sales path xt which maximizes profit. The prices µt are then
computed by “passing back” the next period’s threat price. We may solve the corresponding
dynamic program to find the maximum profit ΠD for the duropolist.
It is easy to see that if there is another strong-Markov SPNE, it cannot result in more revenue
for the duropolist. In any proposed SPNE where we sell in every period, any period price cannot
be higher than the threat price of any consumer who buys in that period, as otherwise she would
earn more profit by waiting one more period. So given a sales schedule, the monopolist can do
no better than to charge the threat price of the lowest valued consumer to buy in each period.
However, (1) finds the optimal sales schedule in terms of revenue when the duropolist charges
threat prices in each period. Lemma A5 covers the case where a strong-Markov SPNE may
choose not to sell in one or more periods when consumers remain to buy. The full result we
have, then, is
Corollary 3.1. The optimal revenue ΠD given by the dynamic program derived from Equations
(1) is the maximum revenue obtainable by a strong-Markov SPNE.
4 When can the Duropolist Extract all the Consumer Surplus?
As discussed, Bagnoli et al. (1989) proved that a duropolist who faces atomic consumers with
an infinite time horizon can always extract all consumer surplus. They left open the case
of finite time horizons. Although such equilibria may still exist under a finite horizon, the
conditions required for their existence are very restrictive. Indeed, applying the techniques
we have developed, we characterize in this section necessary and sufficient conditions for this
phenomenon to happen. We require some definitions and a few lemmas.
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Let G be a game with N consumers with valuations v1 ≥ v2, . . . ,≥ vN and let pi be the static
monopoly price of the subgame consisting of consumers {i, i+ 1, . . . , N}. More generally, given
a subset S ⊆ [N ] we define p(S) to be the static monopoly price of the subgame consisting of
consumers S ⊆ [N ].
Lemma 4.1. A game G satisfies pi = vi for all i ∈ [N ] if and only if p(S) = max{vx : x ∈ S}
for all S ⊆ [N ].
Proof. Suppose there exists a subset S ⊆ [N ] such that p(S) < vi where i = argmax{vx : x ∈ S}.
Let the valuations of the consumers in S be vi ≥ v
′
2 ≥ v
′
3 ≥ . . . ≥ v
′
|S|. Then, we have j · v
′
j > vi
for some j > 1. But then pi < vi since by setting a price of v
′
j in the subgame with consumers
{i, i + 1, . . . , N} yields a profit of at least j · v′j > vi (since in the market Gi there may be more
consumers with valuations between v′j and vi). The remaining implication follows directly.
Let w1 > w2 > . . . > wM denote the M distinct consumer valuations sorted in decreasing
order. Let ni denote the number of consumers with value wi. The following technical lemma
(whose proof is in the Appendix 1) is required to prove the main result of this section. We set
wi = ni = 0 for all i > M .
Lemma 4.2. If pi = vi for all i ∈ [N ], the following inequality holds for every natural number
β ≥ 2, k = 2, . . . , β and all i = 1, . . . , k − 1,
ni · wi − ni · wk − nβ+iwβ+i ≥ 0.
Recall that the duropolist strategy named Pacman is to announce at each time period, a
price equal to the valuation of the consumer with the highest value who has yet to buy, and
that the consumer strategy known as get-it-while-you-can is to buy the first time it induces
a non-negative utility. The next lemma gives sufficient conditions for such strategies to be at
equilibrium. Observe that we are not imposing that the number of periods is greater than or
equal to the number of different consumer valuations. This makes the argument not trivial.
Lemma 4.3. If pi = vi for all i ∈ [N ], then there exists an equilibrium in which the duropolist
uses the pacman strategy and consumers follow the get-it-while-you-can strategy.
Proof. We proceed by induction in the number of time periods. For games with a single period
(i.e., T = 1) the lemma holds because the duropolist announces the optimal static monopoly
price, which is p1. Suppose now that the lemma holds for all games with at most T − 1 periods
and consider a game with T periods. Let A be the set of consumers that buy at period 1 under
an equilibrium E . Observe that by Lemma 4.1, the subgame that begins at period 2, with
consumers [N ]−A satisfies the that pi = vi and therefore there exist an equilibrium where the
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duropolist uses the Pacman strategy from then on. This means that consumers expect zero
profits whenever they don’t buy in the first time period, and therefore they would buy in the
first time period at any price that is not above their valuation. If M ≤ T the duropolist may
announce at t = 1 the price µ1 = v1. All consumers with a valuation of v1 would buy and,
by the inductive hypothesis and the fact that the different valuations in the remaining game is
still less than the time periods left (M − 1 ≤ T − 1), the duropolist would be able to extract
all consumer surplus. Thus, pacman is an optimal strategy. We now analyze the case where
M > T . Observe that because consumers will buy in the first period if and only if the price is not
above their value, the duropolist’s strategy space can be restricted, without loss of generality, to
announcing a first price equal to the valuation of some consumer. Let Π(k) denote the profits
for the whole game if the first price is wk. Since by induction hypothesis the pacman strategy
is an equilibrium after the first period, we have that
Π(k) =
k∑
i=1
ni · wk +
T+k−1∑
j=k+1
nj · wj.
Now we want to show that
Π(1) ≥ Π(k)
for all k = 1, . . . ,M . Consider first the case where k ≤ T . By Lemma 4.2, by setting β = T , we
have that for all k = 1, . . . , T and all i = 1, . . . , k − 1:
0 ≤ ni · wi − ni · wk − nT+i · wT+i
Summing over i we obtain
0 ≤
k−1∑
i=1
(ni · wi − ni · wk − nT+i · wT+i)
=
k−1∑
i=1
ni · wi −
k−1∑
i=1
ni · wk −
T+k−1∑
j=T+1
nj · wj
=
k−1∑
i=1
ni · wi +
T∑
i=k
ni · wi −
k−1∑
i=1
ni · wk −
T∑
i=k
ni · wi −
T+k−1∑
j=T+1
nj · wj
=
T∑
i=1
ni · wi −
k−1∑
i=1
ni · wk −
T+k−1∑
j=k
nj · wj
=
T∑
i=1
ni · wi −
k∑
i=1
ni · wk −
T+k−1∑
j=k+1
nj · wj
= Π(1) −Π(k)
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Thus Π(1) ≥ Π(k). Second, consider the case where k > T . By Lemma 4.2, setting β = k > T ,
we have that for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1:
0 ≤
T∑
i=1
(ni · wi − ni · wk − nk+i · wk+i)
=
T∑
i=1
ni · wi −
T∑
i=1
ni · wk −
T+k∑
j=k+1
nj · wj
= Π(1)−Π(k)
Thus, again, Π(1) ≥ Π(k). So there exists an equilibrium where the duropolist uses the pacman
strategy.
We are now ready to prove the following theorem which provides sufficient and necessary
conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that extracts all consumer surplus.
Theorem 4.1 (Pacman Theorem). Consider a duropoly game G with M ≤ N distinct valua-
tions. There exists an equilibrium at which the duropolist extracts all the consumer surplus if
and only if M ≤ T and vi = pi for all i ∈ [N ].
Proof. Take a game G with M ≤ T and vi = pi for all i ∈ [N ]. By Lemma 4.3 there exists an
equilibrium in which the duropolist uses the pacman strategy. Moreover, since M ≤ T , under
this equilibrium the duropolist obtains all the consumer surplus.
The contrapositive also holds. First, assumeM > T . Then, since the number of time periods
is less than the number of different valuations it is impossible for the duropolist to extract the
value of every consumer before the end of the game. Second, assume vi > pi for some i ∈ [N ].
Now take an equilibrium that extracts all the consumer surplus. At equilibrium, prices must
be non-increasing over time. Moreover, since all consumer surplus is extracted, it implies that
consumers also purchase in decreasing order of value over time which means that the skimming
property holds. If consumer i bought in the last period it means she has the lowest valuation,
i.e. vi = wM , and pi = vi which is a contradiction. In the case consumer i buys before the last
period, Lemma 5.3 (see next section) implies that consumer i never pays more than pi, again a
contradiction.
We conclude this section with some observations. Recall, from Footnote 2, that there exist
finite time horizon games in which the Pacman solution has profits that are a factor logN
greater than static monopoly profits. On the other hand, the main result of next section is that
duropoly profits are approximately the static monopoly profits and never more than twice the
static monopoly profits. Thus, when Pacman is an equilibrium, static monopoly profits are at
least half of Pacman profits. To see this, observe that the condition pi = vi for all i ∈ [N ],
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implies that consumer valuations decrease exponentially. In these scenarios, n1 · v1 (which is
static monopoly revenue) is at least half of the sum of all consumer valuations.
5 A Relationship between Duropoly Profits and Static Monopoly
Profits
In this section, we will prove our main result: the profits of the duropolist in a skimming
property-satisfying SPNE of the duropoly game are at least the profits of the corresponding
static monopolist, but at most double. The first result is straightforward.
Lemma 5.1. ΠM ≤ ΠD
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of periods. The base case is trivial. Consider
the (possibly sub-optimal) sales schedule where the duropolist sells at p1 in period 1, and then
follows an equilibrium strategy for the remaining subgame G′. Let k1 be the number of consumers
sold to in period 1 under this schedule. Let ΠMG = j · vj ≡ j · p1 and Π
M
G′ = (k − k1)vk.
Since j = |{i|vi ≥ vj}|, j ≥ k1 (no one with value less than vj is willing to pay vj). But
k = argmaxi≥k1(i− k1)vi, therefore (k − k1)vk ≥ (j − k1)vj . So
ΠD ≥ k1p1 +Π
D
G′ ≥ k1p1 +Π
M
G′ ≥ k1p1 + (j − k1)vj = k1p1 + (j − k1)p1 = Π
M ,
where, in the second inequality, we used the induction hypothesis.
The second claim is more substantial.
Theorem 5.1. ΠD ≤ (ΠM + p1) ≤ 2 ·Π
M
In Section 5.1 we show that Theorem 5.1 is in fact tight, i.e., duropoly profits can be as
close as desired to twice the static monopoly profits. Observe however, that in many situations
Theorem 5.1 suggests that duropoly profits can be only slightly higher than static monopoly
profits. For example, this happens when the value of the highest value consumer is negligible
with respect to the static monopoly profits, i.e. p1 ≤ v1 << Π
M .
We prove Theorem 5.1 in two steps. To describe them, recall we have N consumers with
valuations v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vN . Furthermore, Gi is the market consisting of consumers {i, i +
1, . . . , N} and pi is the static monopoly price for the market Gi. Each pi is equal to some
consumer’s value so we will define yi as the consumer with the smallest index such that pi = v(yi).
First we show that ΠD ≤
∑N
i=1 pi, and second we show that Π
M + v1 ≥
∑N
i=1 pi.
Lemma 5.2. The maximum profit of the duropolist satisfies ΠD ≤
∑N
i=1 pi.
To prove this we require the following three lemmas.
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Lemma 5.3. In equilibrium, consumer i never pays more than pi whenever she buys before the
last period.
Proof. We proceed by induction in the number of time periods. For T = 2, let A be the set of
consumers that buy at t = 1. Suppose for the purpose of contradiction that some consumer i ∈ A
pays a price higher than pi. Because of the skimming property, we have that A = {1, . . . , k} for
some k. By Lemma 3.1, this price is also more than pk, so consumer k pays more than pk. But
if consumer k refuses to buy at t = 1, then at t = 2 the duropolist would charge pk which is a
contradiction since consumer k would have obtained a higher profit by waiting.
Now suppose that the lemma is true for all games of 1 to T periods and consider a game
G of T + 1 > 2 periods. Let E denote a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with the skimming
property in G. For the purpose of contradiction, suppose that at some time period t (t < T +1),
there is at least one consumer j that pays more than pj . Among all those consumers, let i denote
the one with the lowest valuation. Since it is not true that at period t consumer ℓ pays more
than pℓ for ℓ > i, and by Lemma 3.1 pi ≥ pℓ, then consumer i is the lowest valuation consumer
that buys at period t. Therefore, if consumer i refuses to buy at period t we end in the market
Gi with T + 1− t periods. If T + 1− t = 1 (i.e. t was the second to last period), the duropolist
will charge the price pi at the last period. If T +1− t > 1, it holds by the induction hypothesis
that consumer i would never pay more than pi. Thus, we can conclude that such equilibrium E
cannot exist as consumer i would have obtained a higher profit by waiting.
Lemma 5.4. The maximum revenue of the duropolist satisfies
ΠD ≤ max
m≤N
(
(ym −m+ 1) · v(ym) +
m−1∑
i=1
pi
)
Proof. Consider the subgame perfection conditions. In the final time period T , consumer i is
willing to pay up to vi. In periods 1 to T − 1, consumer i is willing to pay up pi = v(yi), the
static monopoly price for the market Gi.
Suppose that in the optimal solution, the duropolist sells to consumers {m,m + 1, . . . ,M}
where 1 ≤ m ≤M ≤ N in the final period T . Since consumer M = ym buys in the final period,
the revenue then is exactly (ym −m+ 1) · v(ym). By Lemma 5.3, consumers who buy in earlier
periods, that is consumers {1, 2, . . . m−1}, pay at most their static monopoly prices. Therefore,
the maximum revenue is upper bounded by
(ym −m+ 1) · v(ym) +
m−1∑
i=1
pi
The result follows by taking the maximum over all consumers m.
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Lemma 5.5. The static monopoly revenue for the market Gm is at most
N∑
j=m
pj
Proof. Without loss of generality, by re-indexing so that m = 1, it suffices to show that
ΠM = y1 · v(y1) ≤
N∑
j=1
pj (2)
Let C = {pj : j = 1, . . . , N}. We proceed by induction on |C|, that is, the number of distinct
static monopoly prices over all the markets Gj . For the base case, |C| = 1, we have p1 = pj for
all j. Thus p1 = pN = vN and y1 = N . Every consumer then pays vN and the total revenue is
y1 · v(y1) = N · vN =
N∑
j=1
pj
Assume the proposition holds for |C| = k− 1 ≥ 1. Now take the case |C| = k. Let consumer
l be the highest index consumer in the original game with pl = p1. Thus pl+1 < p1 = v(y1). By
the induction hypothesis, applied to the market Gl+1 on consumers {l+1, l+2, . . . , N}, we have
N∑
i=l+1
pi ≥ (yl+1 − l) · v(yl+1) (3)
Consequently,
N∑
i=1
pi = l · p1 +
N∑
i=l+1
pi
≥ l · p1 + (yl+1 − l) · v(yl+1)
≥ l · p1 + (yl − l) · v(yl)
= l · v(yl) + (yl − l) · v(yl)
= yl · v(yl)
= y1 · v(y1)
Here the first equality follows by definition of l. The first inequality follows by (3). The second
inequality holds as v(yl+1) is the static monopoly price for the market Gl+1. The final three
equalities follow by definition of l. That is p1 = pl and so yl = y1.
This shows that (2) holds as desired.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Combine Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 5.5.
It remains to prove the upper bound on
∑N
i=1 pi.
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Lemma 5.6.
∑N
i=1 pi ≤ Π
M + p1
Proof. We proceed by induction on N . For games with a single consumer, the statement is
trivially true. Recall that pi = v(yi) is the static monopoly price for the market Gi on consumers
{i, i + 1, . . . , N} and yi is the index of the lowest value consumer whose value is not less than
pi. Consider now a game G with N + 1 consumers. It remains to show that
N+1∑
i=1
pi ≤ v(y1) + y1 · v(y1).
We proceed as follows:
N+1∑
i=1
pi = v(y1) +
N+1∑
i=2
pi
≤ v(y1) + v(y2) + (y2 − 1) · v(y2) (4)
= v(y1) + y2 · v(y2)
≤ v(y1) + y1 · v(y1) (5)
Here equation (4) follows by the induction hypothesis and inequality (5) comes from the fact
that v(y1) is the static monopoly price of the market G1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. The result follows from Lemmas 5.2 and 5.6.
5.1 A Tight Example
The factor 2 bound is tight. There are examples in which the duropolist can extract twice as
much profit as the equivalent static monopolist. To see this, assume that T = 2 and set vj = vH
for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and vj = vL =
1
n−k+1 · vH for all k+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n. The optimal solution is to charge
VH in the first period and VL in the last period. The high value consumers will buy in the
first period and the low value consumers in the last period. It can be verified that this solution
satisfies the equilibria conditions.
The total revenue is then
k · vH + (n− k) · vL = k · vH +
n− k
n− k + 1
· vH
= ΠM +
(
1−
1
n− k + 1
)
· vH
Thus in the limit n ≫ k we obtain ΠM + vH . As vH = p1, the duropoly profits exceed static
monopoly profits by an additive amount approaching static monopoly profits. Moreover, in the
case k = 1 we have that ΠM = vH and, thus, duropoly profits are twice static monopoly profits.
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6 Non-Skimming Equilibria
In this section, we discuss equilibria that do not satisfy the skimming property. For non-atomic
consumers, it is easy to show that such equilibria cannot exist. However, for atomic consumers,
subgame perfect Nash equilibria that do not satisfy the skimming property can exist. To see
this, consider the following three-consumer, two period problem.8
Table 3: An Example with a Non-Skimming Equilibrium
Consumer valuation Period 1 Strategy Period 2 Strategy
80 Buy if µ1 ≤ 45 Buy if µ2 ≤ 80
70 Buy if µ1 ≤ 70 Buy if µ2 ≤ 70
45 Buy if µ1 ≤ 45 Buy if µ2 ≤ 45
Monopolist µ1 = 70
Charge Static
Monopoly Price (for
remaining
consumers)
Because period 2 is the last period of the game, all the consumers who did not buy in period 1
have a dominant strategy which is “buy iff µ2 ≤ v”. The duropolist’s best response to this is to
charge a value µ2 equal to the static monopoly price for the subgame with all consumers who
did not buy in period 1. It is simple to check that all of the consumers’ strategies are mutual
best responses. The period 1 price is also the price which maximizes revenue for the duropolist,
given the consumer strategies. So this is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. However, in this
equilibrium, the consumer with value 70 buys in period 1, while the consumer with value 80
buys in period 2 (where p2 = 45). Therefore the skimming property is not satisfied. Also note
that the consumer with the second highest value pays his full value, which is significantly more
than p2, the static monopoly price in the market G2 (p2 = 45).
Note, however, that if we swapped the period 1 strategies of the top two consumers, we
would still have an equilibrium, and one which satisfies the skimming property. We can prove
that this is always the case.
Theorem 6.1. In a 2 period game, for every strategy equilibrium which does not satisfy the
skimming property, there is a corresponding equilibrium at the same prices which satisfies the
skimming property and earns the same revenue for the duropolist.
8One can also show that a non-skimming equilibrium exists in this example if we introduce a discount factor
with value strictly less than 1.
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To prove this theorem, we first require some results about static monopoly prices.
Claim 6.1. Let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vN} be a set of valuations v1 ≥ v2 . . . ≥ vN . Let k = argmaxi ivi
and psmV = vk, the static monopoly price calculated for the set V . Now let V
′ be the set V with
some vj replaced by a value vj > v
′ ≥ vk, and re-index the set so v
′
1 ≥ v
′
2 . . . ≥ v
′
n. Then
psmV ′ = vk. If, instead, v
′ ≥ vj > vk and we re-index the set so v
′
1 ≥ v
′
2 . . . ≥ v
′
N , then we still
have psmV ′ ≥ vk.
Proof. First suppose v′ < vj. Note that v
′
i ≤ vi for every i. Therefore, by definition of k,
kvk ≥ ivi ≥ iv
′
i for all i. For all i such that vi ≤ v
′, we still have v′i = vi, so therefore vk = v
′
k
and kv′k ≥ iv
′
i for all i. Therefore k = argmaxi iv
′
i and p
sm
V ′ = vk.
Next assume v′ ≥ vj. Note that, because vj > vk, we still have v
′
i = vi for every i ≥ k, and
as kvk ≥ ivi for all i ≥ k, it follows that the index which maximizes lvl can be no larger than k.
Therefore psmV ′ ≥ v
′
k = vk.
Claim 6.2. Let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vN} be a set of valuations v1 ≥ v2 . . . ≥ vN . Let k = argmaxi ivi
and psmV = vk. Now add a value v
′ ≥ vk to the set of valuations, call the new set V
′ and re-index
the set so v′1 ≥ v
′
2 . . . ≥ v
′
N+1. Then p
sm
V ≤ p
sm
V ′ ≤ v
′.
Proof. Let v′ = v′l (i.e. v
′ is the l-th highest value in V ′). We have that v′i = vi−1 for i > l. The
result follows immediately as for all j < l, jvj ≤ kvk < (k + 1)vk = (k + 1)v
′
k+1, so regardless
of what the maximizing index actually is, it cannot be less than l, and therefore psmV ′ ≤ vl = v
′.
But we also have that (k+1)v′k+1 = (k+1)vk ≥ (j +1)vj = (j +1)v
′
j+1 for all j ≥ k. Therefore
the maximizing index cannot be more that k + 1, and thus v′k+1 = vk = p
sm
V ≤ p
sm
V ′ .
Consider an equilibrium E which violates the skimming property. The violation must occur
in period 1, as in the second period the dominant strategy followed by the consumers ensures
that there is a cut-off value above which all remaining consumers buy. We must then have at
least one pair of consumers which we denote by their values v,w with w > v, where v buys in
period 1 and w does not buy in period 1. Without loss of generality, let w be the highest valued
consumer who doesn’t buy in period 1, and v be the lowest valued consumer who buys with
value below w. We denote by E the set of consumers under the equilibrium E who did not buy
in period 1. Then w ∈ E and v /∈ E.
The period 2 price, µ2(E), is fixed by the fact that it is a dominated strategy to charge the
static monopoly price of the remaining consumers. For a consumer y /∈ E who buys in period
1, we will also need to compare µ1(E) against its threat price, µ2(E
y). Here Ey = E ∪ {y}, and
so µ2(E
y) is the period 2 price y would face if he did not buy.
22
Lemma 6.1. At the equilibrium E, we have
w > v ≥ µ2(E
v) ≥ µ1(E) ≥ µ2(E) (6)
Proof. By assumption w > v. Consumer v wants to buy in the first period. The equilibrium
conditions then imply that (i) µ1(E) ≤ v and (ii) µ1(E) ≤ µ2(E
v). Consumer w does not want
to buy in the first period. But since the first period price is less than his value, he would be
willling to buy in the first period if µ2(E) > µ1(E). The equilibrium conditions then imply
that µ2(E) ≤ µ1(E) < w (and w does buy in the second period). It only remains to prove that
v ≥ µ2(E
v). We have seen that v ≥ µ2(E). But then, by Claim 6.2, we obtain v ≥ µ2(E
v).
To prove Theorem 6.1, we will show that with the same period 1 price, the strategy profile S
which consists of v and w swapping actions from E (and all other consumer strategies remaining
the same) is also an equilibrium. We will also show that the period 2 price stays the same after
swapping. By repeated swapping, we will remove all pairs where the lower valued consumer buys
before the higher valued consumer, until we reach an equilibrium where the skimming property
is satisfied, while the prices are unchanged. So let S = {E − w} ∪ {v} be the set of consumers
who did not buy in period 1 under the swapped strategy S.
Lemma 6.2. For the strategy profiles E and S, we have
w > v ≥ µ2(E
v) = µ2(S
w) ≥ µ1(E) = µ1(S) ≥ µ2(E) = µ2(S) (7)
Proof. The inequalities follow from Lemma 6.1. Thus it remains to prove the three equali-
ties. Since S and E differ in exactly the pair {w, v} we have that Sw = Ev. The equilib-
rium constraints imply the duropolist applies static monopolist pricing in the final period; thus
µ2(S
w) = µ2(E
v). Next, in the proposed solution corresponding to S, the duropolist is, by
choice, setting the same price in period 1 for S as for E; thus µ1(S) = µ1(E). Finally, we know
that v ≥ µ2(E). But, then, if we reduce the value of consumer w to v, the static monopoly price
will not change by the first case of Claim 6.1; equivalently µ2(S) = µ2(E).
Lemma 6.3. The solution corresponding to S is an equilibrium.
Proof. We prove that the strategy profile consisting of v and w swapping actions and all other
consumers acting the same way is still an equilibrium by considering the best responses of every
consumer separately.
• Consumer v: Consumer v buys in the second period for S. If this is a best response strategy
then we need µ2(S) ≤ min[v, µ1(S)]. This is true, by Lemma 6.2.
• Consumer w: Consumer w buys in the first period for S. If this is a best response strategy
then we need µ1(S) ≤ min[w,µ2(S
w)]. This is true, by Lemma 6.2.
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• A consumer u 6= w who buys in period 1: We wish to show that u still wishes to buy in
the first period after we swap: that is, µ1(S) ≤ min[u, µ2(S
u)].
Since v is the lowest valued consumer who buys in period 1, we must have u ≥ v. We know,
by Lemma 6.2 that µ1(S) ≤ v ≤ u. Thus it suffices to prove that µ1(S) ≤ µ2(S
u). We now have
two possibilities:
(a) u < w: By Lemma 6.1, we have µ2(E
v) ≤ v. Now set V = Ev = Sw and apply the first
case of Claim 6.1 with v′ = u and vj = w. Thus, V
′ = Su and µ2(E
v) = µ2(S
u). By the
equilibrium conditions, we know µ1(E) ≤ µ2(E
v). Therefore µ1(S) = µ1(E) ≤ µ2(E
v) =
µ2(S
u).
(b) u ≥ w: By Lemma 6.2, we have µ2(E) = µ2(S) < w. Now set V = S and apply
Claim 6.2 by adding a new consumer with value v′ = w; thus V ′ = Sw and µ2(S
w) ≤ w.
Applying the second case of Claim 6.1 with V = Su and V ′ = Sw and v′ = u, then
gives µ2(S
u) ≥ µ2(S
w). Furthermore, by Lemma 6.2, we know µ1(S) ≤ µ2(S
w); thus
µ1(S) ≤ µ2(S
u), as desired.
• Any other consumer u 6= {w,v}: Such a consumer u either buys in period 2 or does not
buy at all. In the former case, µ2(E) ≤ min[u, µ1(E)]. In the latter case, u ≤ µ2(E) ≤ µ1(E).
But, by Lemma 6.2, we have µ1(S) = µ1(E) and µ2(S) = µ2(E). Therefore, in either case, the
same best response conditions hold for S as they did for E.
Proof of Theorem 6.1: By Lemma 6.3, we know that S gives an equilibrium. From Lemma 6.2,
we have that µ1(S) = µ1(E) and µ2(S) = µ2(E). Since the same number of consumers buy in
each period under S and E , the duropolist earns the same revenue in S as in E . By repeatedly
swapping pairs which are out of order, we obtain an equilibrium with the same revenue which
satisfies the skimming property.
We conjecture that our two-periods result extends to the T -periods case, and therefore our
bounds would apply not just to skimming-property satisfying equilibria, but to all sub-game
perfect Nash equilibria.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we studied the durable good monopoly problem, a classical problem in bargaining
theory. In our setting, we consider consumers to be atomic and that there is a finite time
horizon during which sales occur. We characterized all profit maximising strong-Markovian
equilibria and proved that, in those equilibria, duropolist profits are comparable to those of a
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static monopolist. This is in contrast with previous results in which duropoly profits are either
arbitrary small or arbitrary large compared to those of a static monopolist.
The paper leaves interesting questions for future research. We provided the first example of a
sub-game perfect equilibrium in which the classical skimming-property does not hold. Although
such equilibria might be rare in practice, we proved that for two-period games, the duropolist
profits are not larger in those non-skimming equilibria than in the skimming equilibria. Whether
the duropolist profits are approximately equal to the static monopoly profits (and never more
than twice that) under non-skimming equilibria for games with an arbitrary number of time
periods is a question we believe very worthy of study.
Finally, in this paper we studied the case in which there is no discount factor, neither
for the duropolist, or for the consumers. However, one could easily extend the equilibrium
characterization we provided in Section 3 in order to capture the monopolist and consumers
behaviour when there is a discount factor. Moreover, under a setting with discounts, it is still
true that consumers have more bargaining power than under a infinite time horizon (it is a
simple exercise to construct an example with discounts where the Pacman strategy is not an
equilibrium). But the specific question about how much profits can a duropolist obtain with
respect to the static monopoly profits under a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium remains open.
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Appendix 1: Proofs omitted from main text.
Lemma A1 (Lemma 3.1). Let the consumers in G be ordered by value so vi ≥ vi+1 for all i.
Then static monopoly prices are non-increasing in i: pi ≥ pi+1 for i = 1, . . . , N − 1.
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Proof. Without loss of generality we can restrict to the case i = 1. Let p1 = va and p2 = vb
and therefore a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 2. As a first case, consider that a ≤ b. Given that valuations are
non-increasing, it follows that p1 = va ≥ p2 = vb. As the second case, suppose that a > b ≥ 2.
We know that
ava ≥ bvb,
by definition of p1. Now if a > b, in the market G2 the static monopolist has the option of selling
to exactly the consumers in [2, a]. Therefore, as vb is the static monopoly price for G2, the game
with consumers [2, N ], it follows that
(b− 1)vb ≥ (a− 1)va.
Combining these two inequalities gives us va ≥ vb. But a > b implies vb ≥ va, so we conclude
that va = vb. In either case, va ≥ vb.
Lemma A2 (Lemma 3.2). In any game G with T periods, for all i ≤ k and all t < T , τ(i, t) ≥
τ(k, t).
Proof. We proceed by backwards induction on t. For t = T − 1, τ(i, t) = pi, the static monoply
price for the market Gi, for all i. By Lemma 3.1, pi ≥ pk whenever i ≤ k. Now consider any
earlier period t. p(i, t + 1) = p(j∗(i, t + 1), t + 2) for all i. By the inductive hypothesis, if
j∗(i, t + 1) ≤ j∗(k, t + 1), then we are done. Recall that j∗(k, t + 1) is determined by the sales
schedule which maximizes revenue earned in Gi for the remaining periods. In particular, for all
l ≥ j∗(k, t+ 1),
(j∗(k, t+ 1)− k + 1) · p(j∗(k, t+ 1), t+ 2) + Π(j∗(k, t+ 1) + 1, t+ 2)
≥ (l − k + 1) · p(l, t+ 2) + Π(l + 1, t+ 2)
Again, by the inductive hypothesis, p(j∗(k, t + 1), t + 2) ≥ p(l, t + 2). Now multiply this
inequality by k − i (which is non-negative) and add it to the above to get
(j∗(k, t+ 1)− i+ 1) · p(j∗(k, t+ 1), t+ 2) + Π(j∗(k, t+ 1) + 1, t+ 2)
≥ (l − i+ 1) · p(l, t+ 2) + Π(l + 1, t+ 2),
for every l ≥ j∗(k, t+ 1). Since j∗(i, t + 1) satisfies
j∗(i, t+ 1) = argmax
j≥i
((j − i+ 1) · p(j, t+ 2) + Π(j + 1, t+ 2))
it follows that j∗(i, t+ 1) ≤ j∗(k, t+ 1), which gives us our result.
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Lemma A3 (Lemma 3.3). Consider two duropoly games, G, with T periods and a set S of
consumers, and G′, with T periods and a set S′ of consumers such that only the top valued
consumers in S and S′ differ and the top valued consumer in S′, who we name x, has the
higher value. If we use p∗G(1, 1) and p
∗
G′(1, 1) to denote the first period prices as calculated by the
recursion relationship in Section 3, then p∗G′(1, 1) ≥ p
∗
G(1, 1).
Proof. It is easily seen that in the case T = 1, the result holds (the price either remains the
same or increases to vx). Consider the optimal sales schedule for the game G, and assume this
schedule sells to more than one person in period 1. But prices for a schedule which sells to more
than one person in period 1 do not depend on the value of the top consumer in S (the price in
period 1 depends on the threat price of a lower-valued consumer, and later prices depend only
on the consumers left). Therefore, we can achieve the same profit from such a schedule in G′
with the same prices. So in G′, the optimal sales and pricing schedule either is the same as the
optimal for G, in which case we are done, or involves selling only to x in the first period. If the
durpolist sells to to x in the first period, it is at a price p∗G′(1, 1) equal to x’s threat price. This
is, by definition, the same price as for the game G′′ with consumers S′ but with T − 1 periods
instead of T periods. By the induction hypothesis, this price is higher than the corresponding
optimal first period price pS for the game with consumers S but with T − 1 periods. But pS,
by definition, is the threat price for the top consumer in S in G, and therefore at least as high
as the period 1 threat price under the optimal sales schedule in G (if vi ≥ vj , i’s threat price
is ≥ j’s threat price: see proof of Lemma 3.2 in this section). But the optimal period 1 threat
price is p∗G(1, 1), so p
∗
G′(1, 1) ≥ pS ≥ p
∗
G(1, 1).
It remains to prove the case where the optimal sales schedule in G sells to just the top
consumer in S. In this case, the price charged in period 1 is pS . But by the same argument as
above, the threat price for x is at least as high as pS. Therefore if the optimal sales schedule in
G′ sells to just x in the first period, the first period price is at least as high as in G. But note
that if the duropolist sells to more than one person in period 1 of G′, she achieve the same profit
as a sub-optimal sales schedule in G. But she can clearly beat that reveue by selling to x in
period 1 and then following the optimal sales schedule in G from period 2 onwards. Therefore,
whatever the optimal sales schedule in G′, it must involve selling exactly one item in period 1.
Therefore we have p∗G′(1, 1) ≥ pS = p
∗
G(1, 1).
We have covered all cases, so the lemma is proved.
Lemma A4 (Lemma 3.4). In any game G with T periods, if the duropolist and consumers follow
the strategies described in Section 3, then prices are non-increasing in time.
Proof. If both duropolist and consumer follow the strategies described in Section 3, the duropolist
28
will select an initial sales path {xt} , such that, for the last consumer jt scheduled to buy in
period t (jt =
∑
i≤t xi), we have the recursive relationship:
p(jt + 1, t+ 1) = τ(jt+1, t+ 1) = p(jt+1, t+ 2)
In other words, in period t the duropolist plans to sell to consumers jt + 1, jt + 2, . . . , jt+1 at
jt+1’s threat price. By Lemma 3.2, this is less than or equal the threat price of everyone in
the set {jt + 1, jt + 2, . . . , jt+1}. So under the consumer strategies specified, all xt consumers in
{jt + 1, jt + 2, . . . , jt+1} buy in period t, and the duropolist’s strategy never deviates from the
initial sales path. So the price she charges in each period t is p(jt−1 + 1, t) (with j0 ≡ 0).
As part of Lemma 3.2 we showed that j∗(i, t+ 1) ≤ j∗(k, t+ 1) for all i ≤ k. Using this and
the result of Lemma 2, we have
p(jt−1 + 1, t) = p(jt, t+ 1)
= τ(j∗(jt, t+ 1), t + 1)
≥ τ(j∗(jt + 1, t+ 1), t + 1)
= τ(jt+1, t+ 1)
= p(jt + 1, t+ 1),
where in the fourth line, we use the fact that j∗(jt + 1, t + 1) = jt+1 from the definition of the
jt’s and the argmax condition of the recursion relation (1). So these prices are non-increasing
in time.
Lemma A5. There is a subgame perfect equilibrium which follows the recursion relationship (1)
in which a sale occurs in each period until all consumers have already bought the item, and this
equilibrium achieves at least as much profit for the duropolist as any which allows the duropolist
to not sell in some periods where there are consumers remaining.
Proof. The proof will be by induction. In the case T = 1, it is clearly a dominant strategy for
the durpolist to sell if there are any consumers remaining, as otherwise he will earn nothing.
This also holds for the last period of a longer game in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Now consider T > 1, and to start, assume that the claim is false. Then there must be a
game G with a period tl < T such that the following two conditions hold: (a) there remain
consumers who haven’t bought at the start of period tl, but the duropolist does sell any items
in this period; (b) the duropolist sells items in every subsequent period of the game. So there
is an equilibrium for a game G′, corresponding to the subgame of G starting at tl, where the
duropolist sells nothing in the first period, and sells at least one item in all subsequent periods,
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until all consumers have bought, and this equilibrium yields strictly more profit than one which
follows (1). Thus, to show our claim is true, we only need to show that equilibria where we
sell nothing in the first period followed by sales in every subsequent period (until all consumers
have bought) do not yield more profit than those which follow the recursion relationship (1).
Furthermore, it is enough to show a sub-optimal sales schedule yields as much profit, as the
optimal recursion relationship result must do even better.
Let G(N,T ) be our game with a set of consumers N and T periods. If nothing is sold in
the first period, and the duropolist sells at least one item in each subsequent period (until all
consumers have bought), the duropolist can achieve profit of at most ΠDG(N,T−1) (see discussion
preceeding Corollary 3.1). Let k ≥ 1 and p be the number of items sold in the first period and
the first period price, respectively, of G(N,T − 1) under (1). Consider the following (possibly
sub-optimal) strategies for G(N,T ): the duropolist sells at price p in period 1 and follows the
equilibrium of (1) for all subsequent periods, while the consumers buy iff the price is less than
their threat price. We know that the top consumer will buy in period 1 as she would be offered
the same price if everyone refused to buy in period 1. We also know that no consumer i > k will
buy as p is equal to k’s threat price, τG(N,T−1)(k, 1), but if i and all below her refused to buy
in G(N,T ), the price in the second period of G(N,T ) would be at most τG(N,T−1)(k + 1, 1). So
some number 1 ≤ l ≤ k buys in the first period. By definition of (1), we sell at least one item
in each subsequent period as well, as long as there are consumers remaining to buy. If l = k,
then, by the induction hypothesis, we make at least ΠDG(N−[k],T−2) with sales in each subsequent
period until all consumers are sold to. So our total profit from this possibly sub-optimal scheme
is at least
ΠDG(N−[k],T−2) + k · p = Π
D
G(N,T−1).
If 1 ≤ l < k, we know that ΠDG(N−[l],T−1) is larger than the profit obtained by selling to k− l
consumers at price p and then following the equilibrium for G(N − [k], T − 2) given by (1). So
we obtain profit of
l · p+ΠDG(N−[l],T−1) ≥ l · p+ (k − l) · p+Π
D
G(N−[k],T−2) = Π
D
G(N,T−1).
Therefore under the optimal schedule, the profit is at least ΠDG(N,T−1). Therefore there is no
benefit to waiting a period before starting to sell. This proves the claim.
Lemma A6 (Lemma 4.2). If pi = vi for all i ∈ [N ], the following inequality holds for every
natural number β ≥ 2, k = 2, . . . , β and all i = 1, . . . , k − 1,
ni · wi − ni · wk − nβ+iwβ+i ≥ 0.
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Proof. The statement is trivially true if k > M as then wk = wβ+i = 0. Thus, we may assume
that 1 ≤ i < k ≤M . First we show that wi ≥ 2wk. By assumption, pi = vi. Hence
1 · wi ≥ (1 + ni+1 + . . . + nk) · 2 · wk (8)
Similarly
wk ≥ (1 + nk+1 + nk+2 + . . . + nβ+i) · wβ+i ≥ nβ+i · wβ+i (9)
Combining (8) and (9) we have
ni · wi − ni · wk − nβ+iwβ+i ≥ ni · wi − (ni + 1) · wk
≥ ni · wi − (ni + 1) ·
wi
2
≥ 0
as desired.
Appendix 2: Incomplete Information.
In this appendix, we introduce a restrictive incomplete information setting and show that the
SPNE characterization obtained in Section 3 for the complete information setting also applies
here.
Consider the setting in which the market participants can see who buys in period t, and know
the distribution of values (and know their own value), but do not know exactly which consumer
has which value.9 Since we are interested in studying equilibria that satisfy the skimming
property, regardless of the values of consumers who bought at period t, the duropolist off-path
belief is that the k consumers who bought in period t are those with the k highest valuations
(among those remaining). We will show that the same conditions as in Section 3 characterizing
the subgame perfect equilibria apply.
We first define the strategy of the duropolist and the consumers in any subgame under this
incomplete information setting. Let GS denote the subgame at period t where the |S| remaining
consumers have valuations w1 ≥ w2 . . . ≥ w|S|. Due to the off-path belief (i.e., the belief that
consumers follow the skimming property), the duropolist would behave as if it were in the market
G′1 with T − t + 1 periods in which the consumers are v
′
1 ≥ v
′
2 ≥ . . . , v
′
|S| where v
′
i = vi+N−|S|.
Observe that v′i ≤ wi for all i ∈ [|S|]. The monopolist strategy is to then announce the price
p∗G′(1, 1) which is obtained by solving the recursion relationship (1). The consumers strategy
remains the same as in the complete information setting, i.e. each of them would buy if and
9Note this is equivalent to the participants knowing which consumer has which value, but not seeing who buys,
only the total number of sales in each period.
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only if the price is less than or equal to their threat price as calculated for G′. We now prove
the following result.
Theorem A1. The strategies defined above constitute a SPNE in the incomplete information
setting.
Proof. We consider the subgame G′ = GS (of the original game G) that begins at period t
in which the remaining consumers consists of the set S. These consumers have valuations
w1 ≥ w2 . . . ≥ w|S|. Due to the off-path belief (i.e., the belief that consumers follow the
skimming property), the duropolist would behave as if it were in the market G′1 with T − t+ 1
periods in which the consumers are v′1 ≥ v
′
2 ≥ . . . , v
′
|S| where v
′
i = vi+N−|S|. Observe that in this
market G′1, consumer i’s real value is actually wi ≥ v
′
i.
The announced price in G′1 would then be p(1, t) = p(j
∗(1, t), t+1). Suppose now that some
consumer x that was supposed to buy under the proposed equilibrium, i.e. i ≤ x ≤ j∗(1, t)
deviates and chooses not to buy at time t. The number of sales at period t would then be
j∗(1, t) − 1, i.e., one less than the expected. The duropolist, who observes the total number
of sales and assumes consumers follow the skimming property, would then behave as if the
remaining subgame starting at t+ 1 is G′
j∗(1,t). This means that the announced price would be
p(j∗(1, t), t + 1) and consumer x would not have benefited from delaying the purchase by one
period. One may, again, wonder whether consumer x could benefit from delaying the purchase
by more than one period. But this is not possible since the price at period t+1 in this subgame
is p(j∗(1, t), t+1) = p(j∗(j∗(1, t), t+1), t+2) , which means the price will remain constant over
time, as long as the number of transactions is one less than the expected. By repeated use of
this argument we conclude that, at equilibrium, no consumer would benefit from delaying its
purchase.
Lastly, observe that no consumer can benefit from buying earlier. If a consumer deviates
from the equilibrium path by buying earlier, she pays a price p∗(1, t) when she could have bought
in period t′ > t at price p∗(k, t′) for some k ≥ 1. But since prices are non-increasing as a function
of time along the proposed sales path (Lemma 3.4), she cannot do any better.
So we conclude that we have a strategy profile which is an equilibrium in every subgame.
Note that since the equilibrium path is the same in both our complete and incomplete
information setting, all our results also apply to the incomplete information setting.
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